Abstract

Whilst many science educators, it is reported, associate knowledge with justified true belief (JTB), epistemologists have observed that the JTB model is an incomplete account of knowledge. Moreover, researchers from several fields have argued that developing scientific expertise involves not only the acquisition of knowledge that can be expressed in the form of a sentence, propositional knowledge, but also knowledge that cannot be articulated. This article examines the Mary’s room thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson and applies it to the context of science education. The thought experiment imagines a scientist, Mary, who has learned all the available scientific information about the physical properties of a tomato and the process of colour vision without directly experiencing the fruit. Jackson poses the question of whether Mary will gain new knowledge when she encounters a tomato for the first time. An argument is put forward that propositional and non-propositional knowledge are distinct, and a case is made for the value of non-propositional knowledge in learning science. An analogy is drawn between the scientist in Jackson’s thought experiment and a learner in a science classroom who is taught propositional knowledge about a scientific concept without directly experiencing relevant phenomena. It is argued that this approach to teaching fails to develop the learner’s non-propositional knowledge. A number of strategies for supporting learners to develop non-propositional knowledge are discussed. It is argued that science educators should consider the phenomenological curriculum, the experiences that students should be introduced to alongside propositional knowledge, in order to develop scientific understanding.

Highlights

  • Whilst many science educators, it is reported, associate knowledge with justified true belief (JTB), epistemologists have observed that the JTB model is an incomplete account of knowledge

  • The justified true belief model suggests that knowledge is propositional (Moser 1987); that is, knowledge of a fact is expressed in the clause of a sentence following the word ‘that’ (Carter and Poston 2018), for example, ‘I know that whales are mammals’

  • To return to the classroom example introduced earlier, Mary, the student learning about magnetism, can be conceptualised as gaining non-propositional knowledge that is significant for her scientific understanding when she is allowed to experience the forces that act between magnetic poles for the first time

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Summary

The Goals of Science Education

Science education has been imagined to have a number of goals including the following: the acquisition of scientific knowledge and fostering understanding (Smith and Siegel 2016), the development of an ability to engage with communities of scientific practice (Aikenhead 1996), the appreciation of the nature of science (Osborne and Dillon 2008), the development of students’ scientific reasoning (Kind and Osborne 2017), engagement in social action (Hodson 2010) and supporting students’ aesthetic appreciation (Girod et al 2003). Whilst several accounts of knowledge have been proposed as alternatives to the justified true belief model, they mostly retain a propositional form Such definitions are problematic as propositional knowledge alone does not fully describe the epistemic states a learner can possess (Henderson and Horgan 2000; Shapiro and Stolz 2019; Weisberg and Newcombe 2017) and non-propositional knowledge is seen as a significant aspect of scientific knowing (Collins 2010; diSessa 1993). A variety of models of non-propositional knowledge have been proposed, including the following: technê (Aristotle 2014), knowledge-how (Ryle 1945), tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1974), procedural knowledge (Squire 1986) and practical knowledge (Van Der Steen and Sloep 1993) These varied concepts may be describing the same phenomenon—an axiom of the embodied cognition research programme assumes that concepts are not purely propositional in form, but involve information drawn from the sensorimotor and perceptual systems (Barsalou 2008; Mahon and Caramazza 2008). The thought experiment is applied to the context of science education and it is asserted that science learners’ experiences of objects and phenomena lead to the acquisition of knowledge that is distinct from propositional knowledge, and, in addition, that such knowledge is valuable for developing scientific understanding

The Knowledge Argument
Responses to the Knowledge Argument
The Knowledge Argument in the Classroom
Strategies to Develop Students’ Non-propositional Scientific Knowledge
Practical Work
Technologically Enhanced Activities
Findings
Conclusions—Towards a Phenomenological Curriculum
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