Keeping Denial-of-Service Attackers in the Dark

Abstract

AbstractWe consider the problem of overcoming (Distributed) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by realistic adversaries that can eavesdrop on messages, or parts thereof, but with some delay. We show a protocol that mitigates DoS attacks by eavesdropping adversaries, using only available, efficient packet filtering mechanisms based mainly on (addresses and) port numbers. Our protocol avoids the use of fixed ports, and instead performs ‘pseudo-random port hopping’. We model the underlying packet-filtering services and define measures for the capabilities of the adversary and for the success rate of the protocol. Using these, we analyze the proposed protocol, and show that it provides effective DoS prevention for realistic attack and deployment scenarios.KeywordsMessage Authentication CodePort NumberAttack ScenarioDirected AttackDelivery ProbabilityThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.