Abstract

In recent times functionalism as a method and as a theory has become a subject for discussion and arguments with regard both to general methodology and to sociology. Views on functionalism differ and so we find very open adherents and severe critics of functionalist methods and theory- Functionalism was already reproached for its lack of unity and ambiguousness in the concept of function (Nagel, Merton), is criticized for teleological consequences and because it does not have the right to represent itself as an independent method since, in reality, it is only another expression for a sociological method and sociological analyses in general (Kingsley Davis). Functionalism is reproached for overlooking or underestimating changes; others point to its unjustified right to swallow or reject the causal method. On the other hand, T. Parsons, for instance, is among the authors who defend functionalism as a method and theory. Despite all the lack of uniformity in utilizing the term function, the concept of function in Parsons’ view is concentrated into two meanings. He regards function as a contribution of elements or items of a system working toward its maintenance, or as a variable that finds concrete expression in its conception of variable patterns. An analysis of Parsons’ conception of function and functionalism leads to conclusion on the tautological and teleological results of his functional analyses. Parsons’ conception of function applied to complex systems which contain large numbers of variables, objectively leads to the modernized version of the theory of many or more factors in explaining a social system. However, Parsons moves from the conception of many variables to the affirmation of the decisive role of institutionalized structures of cultural and value patterns. His original functionalistic concept of many variables leads objectively to cultural determinism in explaining society; this means that society is reduced to cultural and value patterns and explained from super-structural components. The West German author, N. Luhmann, attempts a more perfect concept of functionalism, devoid of its shortcomings. He introduces his concept of functional equivalents, rejecting the causal method. He endeavors to avoid a partisan, routine concept of functionalism. He brings the functional method to the concept of functional theory which is linked with his conceptions of open systems. Although his concept is really devoid of routine, partisan functionalism, yet it is evident that Luhmann does not know the dialectical concept of functionalism as a form of manifestation of causal continuity, which in Marxism itself is understood only as a moment and an element of the general continuity and concatenation of phenomena. However, the mutual effect of phenomena and elements in Marxism are subordinate to the basic structural unity and structural activities which permit the arrangement of elements and items of a system into a given hierarchical system of coordinated and superior and inferior constituents.

Highlights

  • In recent t1mes functionalism as a rnethod and as a theory has become a subject for discussion and arguments with regard both to general methodology and to sociology

  • Views on functionalism differ and so we find very open adherents and severe critics of functionalist rnethods and theory

  • The mutual effect of phenomena and elements in Marxism are subordinate to the basic structural unity and structural activiUes which permit the arrangement of elements and items of a system into a given hierarchical system of coordinated and superior and inferior constituents

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Summary

NIKLAS LUHMANN A JEHO POKUSY O MODERNIZACI FUNKCIONÁLNi METODY

Luhmannova koncepce funkcionalismu je zaměřena jednoznač­ ně proti kauzální metodě. Nelze již· ·béz dalšího vysvětlovat příčiny z jejich účinků, tj. funkci ně}akého jednání jako účinek, protože vidět funkci nějakého jednání jako účinek není ještě dostačující důvod, že faktický výskyt tohoto jednání je vysvětlen nebo že umožňuje předpověď. Běžné pojetí funkcionální teorie systémů však preferuje strukturní stabilitu a podceňuje problém změny nebo ho považuje zásadně za odvozený ve smyslu následujících úvah: Není možné zjistit změny a jejich příčiny, dokud nemáme prostudované stabilní strukturní vztahy~ Luhmann se opět snaží vyhnout takovému poJetí, kritizuje proto Pars-onse, že jeho strukturně funkcionální teorieklade pojem struktury před pojem funkce. Luhmann odstraňuje některé nedostatky tradičního pojetí zvláště amerického funkcionalismu, když se snaží vystříhat tautologických hodnotících prvků při pojetí funkcí a když uzná'" vá změnu jako důsledek jeho principu ekvivalence; Nápadný je však jeho přehlíživý postoj k tr.adicím diale-ktického myšlení, které již od Hegela a poz;ději př.es Marxe, Engelse i Lenina bylo s to poukázat na jednostrannost, omezenost a nedostatHčnost k

MARXISTICKE POJETÍ KAUZALITY A FUNKCIONALISMU
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