Karl Mannheim: Revision of an Intellectual Portrait

Abstract

Mannheim's ideas have affected the growth of modern sociological thought; his works found a strong response, both favorable and unfavorable. Yet there prevails considerable confusion regarding the actual nature of his contribution. This discussion hopes to clarify the problem concerning Mannheim's work and its interpretation. The available evidence indicates that we can only arrive at an understanding of Mannheim's contribution to modern sociology if we realize that his thinking has repeatedly changed its course. This picture of Mannheim has been derived from the realization that we must distinguish between four phases or stages of development as far as the content and direction of his intellectual activity are concerned. K ARL MANNHEIM'S name is firmly linked with the sociology of knowledge which is chiefly known for its preoccupation with the problematic connections between sociocultural factors and thought in its various manifestations. Mannheim's resolute research led him into an intellectual frontier which Louis Wirth has well designated as an area of dangerous thought.' A disquieting inquiry into sacred institutions and beliefs constituted part of Mannheim's investigation. Therefore, he invited numerous attacks and criticisms. But, we have to turn to Mannheim's few defenders for the much needed elucidation of his complex sociology. Notably, Louis Wirth and Paul Kecskemeti have provided significant interpretations of his work.2 My analysis of Mannheim's ideas adopts a comprehensive frame of reference.3 This research intention calls for the formulation of specific assumptions. THE HYPOTHESIS Mannheim's picture as here developed is a dynamic one which has undergone significant changes. Since he lived in continuous contact with the realities of a world experiencing rapid transformations, these changes in his thinking follow an inherent logic. The hypothesis here presented is that Mannheim's thinking has undergone four changes, which we shall refer to as phases of his intellectual development. They are briefly described below: First Phase: Mannheim accepts an absolute historism as the basis of his thinking and his interpretation of sociocultural reality. He developshis radical sociology of knowledge which claims, in contrast to Scheler's moderate view, that all thoughts in the human studies are determined in form and content by nontheoretical factors. He expands the concept of ideology from Marx's total and special one into one that is total but general. Thus, all knowledge becomes existentially determined. In answer to the charge of relativism, he develops a number of defensive arguments, among them the assertion that the socially unattached intelligentsia has access to truth since this group is supposedly not attached to any specific existential position.4 ' Louis Wirth, Preface to Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (translated by Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, 2nd edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), pp. xvi-xvii. 2 Cf. ibid pp. xiii-xxxi. Cf. also his Modern German Conceptions of American Journal of Sociology, XXXII (November 1926), pp. 461-470, and Karl Mannheim, American Sociological Review, XII (June 1947), 356-357. Cf., furthermore, his Ideological Aspects of Social Disorganization, American Sociological Review, V (August 1940), 472-482. Paul Kecskemeti, Introduction, in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge (translated by Paul Kecskemeti, London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1952), pp. 1-32. 3 Cf. also Gunter W. Remmling, Karl 1893-1947, fur Rechtsund Sozialphilosphie, XLIII/2 (May 1957), 271-285. 4Cf. Historismus, fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 52, 1924, pp. 1 ff., and Das Problem einer Soziologie des Wissens, Archiv filr Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 53, 3, 1925, pp. 601 ff. For his ontological and conceptual theorizing against Marx see K. Ideology and Utopia, pp. 62-84. His central argument concerning the expansion of the concept of ideology is: We add here another distinction to our earlier one of 'particular and total', namely that of 'special and general'. While the first distinction concerns the This content downloaded from 157.55.39.35 on Wed, 31 Aug 2016 05:17:17 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms