Abstract
AbstractIn the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time. I argue that these representations are unitary independently of all synthesis and explain how this avoids problems encountered by other positions regarding the Transcendental Deduction and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic in that work. Central is the claim that these representations (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only an infinitude of merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility that are determined (immediately, in the case of reception) by means of syntheses that accord with the categories.
Highlights
In the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Immanuel Kant appears to make incompatible claims regarding the unitary natures of what he takes to be our a priori representations of space and time.1 On the one hand, some of his claims appear to imply that, as unitary, these representations are produced by means of some kind of synthesis
It is not possible to ignore the seeming incompatibility between these claims. Whether one takes these representations of space and time to be produced by means of synthesis plays a direct role in how one understands the CPR’s Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding (TD) and its relation to the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA) section of that work
Central to my position is the claim that our a priori representations of space and time (1) contain, when characterized as intuitions and considered as prior to any affections of sensibility, only merely possible finite spatial and temporal representations, and (2) are representations that are merely the transcendental grounds for the possibilities for receiving or generating finite representations in sensibility determined by means of syntheses that accord with the categories
Summary
In order to discuss intellectualism, I must first put the spotlight on its motivations. Both in the TA and later in CPR, that he takes original space and time as unitary representations to be intuitions (cf B40, A32/B48, A42/B60, B136n.) He makes it clear that he regards them as intuitions that, in some sense, contain (enthalten) manifolds of intuitions as their parts (Teile) (cf A25/B39, A31–2/ B47–8, B136n.). With this in mind, it is possible to draw out some initial motivation for an intellectualist position. Given that original space and time are intuitions (representations) that contain manifolds, we can say, from the first passage, that they must have a necessary relation to the I think – meaning they must, at the very least, be able to be thought as mine. Noting that ‘the function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgement’ is a function of synthesis for Kant (cf. A78–9/B104–5, B141–3), so long as one reads ‘the pure concept of the understanding’ as ‘the category’,6 it is possible to read the third passage above as lending support to this conclusion. That is, it is possible to read Kant as claiming that the function of categorial synthesis produces original space and time by giving unity to the manifolds of intuition in original space and time, just as it gives synthetic unity to manifolds of intuition in general.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
