Kant’s Non-Universal Cosmopolitanism

Abstract

In the seventh and final chapter, I examine the extent to which Kant’s theory impacts his cosmopolitan project and conclude that Kant’s cosmopolitanism is a de facto exclusive form of right (i.e. non-universalist) because of its addressees and content. The investigation into his account of natural predispositions would have already led us to conclude that in Kant’s view only the white race is included in his pragmatic project because it is the only race which possesses all natural predispositions for moral development. From this standpoint, in this chapter I first posit the link between Kant’s racial theory and his cosmopolitanism. Second, I demonstrate that the “orthodox reading” of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is inconsistent with Kant’s account of the development of his natural predispositions and subsequently with his account of human history. To this end, through the understanding of James Tully, who is one the few critics to elaborate a global contextual analysis of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which takes into account not only Towards Perpetual Peace but also Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, I show that the “orthodox reading’s” narrative which sees Kant’s cosmopolitanism as an expression of egalitarian racial theory and anti-colonialism is far removed from Kant’s contextual reality. Two scholars from the “orthodox reading” will serve as examples to prove my point. The first is Pauline Kleingeld, who, although she apprehends correctly that Kant’s final end of history is the full development of human natural predispositions, fails to take the next step and to identify the link between Kant’s conception of race through the development of natural predispositions and his cosmopolitan project. In other words, Kleingeld fails to see that Kant’s account of natural predispositions determines his cosmopolitanism. The second scholar is Lea Ypi, who in her very recent essay “Commerce and Colonialism in Kant’s Philosophy,” published in Kant and Colonialism, argues in line with Kleingeld that Kant changed his mind on his account of germs and predispositions in the 1790s. For Ypi, Kant not only changed the meaning of his natural predispositions, but he also abandoned the notion of germs which was responsible for the development of the moral and physical features of the race. However, she fails to provide evidence in support of her claim. I reject this assumption because it is founded upon a misleading abstraction. I provide evidence which supports my argument that not only did Kant not even once consider changing his account of natural predispositions but also that he continues to elaborate and rely on it well after the period of his presupposed rethinking. Therefore, I conclude that the “orthodox reading” of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is inadequate and misleading. This leads me finally to posit the “heterodox reading,” which demonstrates that Kant’s cosmopolitanism, because it relies on his account of natural predispositions, its addressees and content, is in fact, a de facto exclusive (i.e. non-universal) form of right.