Kant's Ethical Duties and their Feminist Implications

Abstract

If feminist ethics is to be “identified by its explicit commitment to challenging perceived male bias in ethics,” as Alison Jaggar states, then Kant's moral theory must be considered non-feminist. Indeed, many feminist philosophers have considered Kant's ethics to be anti-feminist. Some of these philosophers have noted such things as Kant's ascription, in his political theory, of all women to the class of passive citizens, and such reflections, in his writings about human nature, as “I hardly believe that the fair sex is capable of principles.” Other feminist critics have argued that Kant's ethics is scarred by male-bias at a fundamental level. For example, Sally Sedgwick has argued that Kant's conception of autonomous, rational agency, embodied in the categorical imperative's universal law tests, is inherently masculinist. Kant's ethics, however, has its feminist proponents as well. Jean Hampton endorses“ a Kantian conception of worth,” according to which “one must respect the value not only of others but also of oneself, and must therefore reject any roles, projects, or occupations which would be self-exploitative”; she develops her own “feminist form of Kantian contractarian theory” as an expression and elaboration of this Kantian notion of respect.