Abstract
This paper examines the meaning and justification which Kant gives to his concept of human freedom. I begin with the deduction of freedom in the second Critique. This deduction of freedom from the moral law appears unexpectedly in a section ostensibly devoted to the deduction of that same moral law, a deduction which, it turns out, is both unneeded and out of reach (47). 1 Further inquiry directs us to the antinomies of pure reason in the transcendental dialectic of the first Critique. Combining the results obtained from these two sources, I summarize and briefly criticize Kant's arguments for the validity of his concept of causation through freedom.
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