Abstract
Abstract:In his critical works, Kant specifies the concept of “intellectual intuition” in three different ways. First, he identifies intellectual intuition with God’s original intuition. Second, he describes intellectual intuition as non-sensible intuition that can apprehend noumenal objects. And third, he characterizes a kind of non-discursive but intellectual perception as intuitive understanding. The paper points out that this ambiguity is coherent by considering the polemical context in which Kant criticizes rationalistic metaphysics and epistemology, especially the views of Spinoza and Leibniz. In addition, it is shown that “moderate” rationalism in contemporary epistemology ignores Kant’s decisive criticism of the view that non-sensible intuition can justify philosophical knowledge.
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