Kant's account of moral weakness

Marijana Vujošević

doi:10.1111/ejop.12389

Abstract

AbstractOn the one hand, Kant seems to suggest that moral weakness is merely expressed at the level of following maxims. On the other hand, he addresses moral weakness as the first grade of our propensity to evil, which implies that moral weakness is also expressed at the level of adopting maxims. There is still a lack of clarity in the literature concerning how the relationship between these two aspects is to be understood, and a proper account of the nature of the maxims of the morally weak has yet to be offered. Drawing on my earlier interpretation of moral strength, I shall propose a reading of Kant's account of moral weakness that consistently unifies both aspects. On my interpretation, the morally weak agent lacks the moral strength that he ought to acquire through the continuous exercise of his power of self‐control; he therefore fails both to set himself particular moral ends in adopting his maxims and to follow his maxims by realizing such ends. His intention to do what the moral law demands is overly general: It does not set a particular moral end, which is what virtue requires.

Highlights

Kant's brief treatment of moral weakness is puzzling
Kant's conception of moral weakness should not be understood as a failure to act in accordance with our genuinely moral maxims, for such a reading cannot fully capture Kant's point that moral weakness represents the first grade of moral evil
By indicating how moral weakness, as a mere lack of moral strength, is expressed both at the level of adopting maxims and at the level of following them, the analysis offered here unifies both aspects put forward by Kant

Summary

| INTRODUCTION

Kant's brief treatment of moral weakness is puzzling. On the one hand, he seems to suggest that moral weakness is merely expressed at the level of following our maxims. I determine what goes wrong at the level of maxim adoption with the morally weak agent: The subjective motivating ground of his maxims remains impotent in practice because he fails to properly exercise his capacity for self‐control in new situations.8 This approach to Kant's conception of moral weakness has certain advantages. The agent who does not acquire moral strength by properly exercising his capacity for self‐control in ever‐new situations can be said to have a weak heart and weak maxims—he can be said merely to lack virtue, understood as the firmly grounded disposition to act from duty (R 6: 23n; 6: 14). The morally weak agent does not exercise this capacity in ever‐new situations, and the subjective determining ground of his choice remains impotent in practice Since he does not cultivate moral feeling by adopting particular moral maxims, he does not become “affected” by his theoretical cognition of what he ought to do. The following description seems to capture his inner conflict best: in abstracto, the weak‐willed agent has the will to do what the moral law requires; in concreto, he does not make an effort to strengthen his general moral intention by setting himself moral ends in ever‐new situations

| CONCLUSION

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