Abstract

Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer. ( CPR , a vii) INTRODUCTION This chapter pursues two principal aims. The first is to assess the recent reception of metaphysics, especially of ‘Kantian metaphysics’, in contemporary liberalism. The second aim is to sketch a metaphysical framework for analysing Kant's account of political obligation in the Rechtslehre . As regards the first aim, I focus on the liberal theories of John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas. Not only are these two thinkers dominant figures in current liberal thinking – but their approaches to justice and political justification are also deeply in influenced by Kant, albeit in very different ways. However, I do not offer a detailed discussion of their respective theories; my intention is merely to consider their views on the role of metaphysics in political thinking. With regard to the second aim of this chapter, I draw on Stephan Korner's recent analysis of the structure and function of metaphysics in general. In adapting Korner's analysis to the political context I first contrast his account of metaphysics in terms of a person's categorial framework with Rawls' most recent view of it as the expression of an individual's private beliefs about the world.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.