KANT'S TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF GENESIS

Abstract

Two distinct interpretations of the early chapters of Genesis are to be found in Kant's writings. 'Speculative Beginning of Human History' was written in 1786, five years after the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason and two years before the Critique of Practical Reason. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone was written in 1793, three years after the Critique of Judgement.1 Kant's interpretation of the myth of the Fall of Adam and Eve in 'Speculative Beginning of Human History', as its title suggests, is concerned to outline a philosophy of history. The later interpretation in Religion is concerned with the problem of evil and its origin. The two distinct problem atics lead to divergent, and at points contradictory readings. Despite this, each study may be seen to be a comment upon and a criticism of the other. The studies share a common reference, derived from the main part of the critical philosophy, by characterizing human beings as at once natural and rational creatures. The divergence of the studies will be seen to centre upon the understanding of morality and evil, and the relevance of real historical time to the resolution of the attendant tensions, in a perfected human society. The two essays differ most markedly in their treatment of historical time. 'Speculative Beginning' accepts that the narrative of the first six chapters of Genesis reproduces a real historical movement, albeit that the individual humans whose actions are so narrated are taken to be personifications of human groups. Hence, the time within which individuals act in the narrative is read as the time of historical and social development. For 'Speculative Beginning' Genesis presents merely an abstraction from the complexity of real historical events. (SB; p. 50) In Religion, the temporal narrative is more radically questioned. (R; pp. 36—37) The temporal succession of events is significant only in so far as temporal succession indicates logical primacy. While the earlier essay is concerned with the origin of morality as an historical event, the later essay is concerned with the origin of evil in each individual human being. The seeming temporality of the Fall of Adam is thereby fused with the atemporal doctrine of original sin. This distinction leads to highly divergent evaluations of Eden. According