Abstract
AbstractThis article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong and Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show that Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity advances traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’.
Highlights
Kant claims that sciences must take the form of systems (MFNS, : ) and his views on systematicity have received considerable attention (Falkenburg : – ; Sturm : – ; Hoyningen-Huene : – ; van den Berg : – ; Gava ; Blomme ; Gava )
In contrast to Hinske, I argue that Meier, Lambert and Kant all accepted an axiomatic idea of science as articulated by the Classical Model, and that this explains their concepts of systematicity
Kant’s idea of systematicity is anticipated by Meier and Lambert. This is not surprising given that these authors construed the notion of systematicity on the basis of a widely accepted axiomatic idea of science
Summary
Kant claims that sciences must take the form of systems (MFNS, : ) and his views on systematicity have received considerable attention (Falkenburg : – ; Sturm : – ; Hoyningen-Huene : – ; van den Berg : – ; Gava ; Blomme ; Gava ). In contrast to Hinske, I argue that Meier, Lambert and Kant all accepted an axiomatic idea of science as articulated by the Classical Model, and that this explains their concepts of systematicity To achieve this aim I show that Kant’s critique of Wolff’s mathematical method is consistent with his adherence to the Classical Model. In the philosophical sciences, if we adopt the analytic method, we often only have what Kant calls expositions, i.e. a possibly incomplete set of marks contained in a concept (A /B ; JL, : ) Note that such expositions follow the model of concepts as specified by the Classical Model: we describe non-fundamental concepts (species) in terms of more fundamental concepts or marks (genera), even though we cannot be certain that our list of marks is complete.
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