Kant's 'formula of humanity' and assisted reproductive technology: a case for duties to future children.

Abstract

The paper asks the question whether Kant's ethical theory can be applied to issues in assisted reproductive technology (ART). It argues against three objections to applying Kant's ethics to ART: (i) the non-identity objection, (ii) the gen-ethics objection, and (iii) the care-ethics objection. After showing that neither of the three objections is sufficiently persuasive the paper proposes a reading of Kant's 'formula of humanity,' and especially its negative clause (i.e., the 'merely as means' clause), that can be of some guidance in ART. The paper conclude that although Kant's 'formula of humanity' cannot be used as a simple litmus test for determining whether an ART practice is morally permissible or not, it nonetheless can supply us with some guidance in our moral deliberation.