Kant’s Conception of Nonmoral Good

Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is that a Kantian conception of the highest good is better rendered through the classical Aristotelian theory of perfection or human fulfillment than through the notion which Kant does in fact present, i.e., virtue and happiness. A secondary concern is the consideration of the extent to which Kant actually holds, or at least could hold, such a conception. The paper moves entirely in the sphere of value theory, of nonmoral good, and not at all in Kant's moral philosophy in the strict sense. Let it be noted at the outset, therefore, that I shall not be arguing for a classical view of the relation between virtue and the good, in an effort to reverse Kanťs Copernican revolution in ethics, but only for a classical conception of the content of the good itself. The first task in this undertaking will be to characterize the perfection theory in relation to Kanťs view of man. That will amplify the main thesis. Next comes the attempt to present a rationale for our main thesis. This rationale has two parts, affirmative and negative. The affirmative part consists in showing that the Kantian system is in need of a revised statement on the good and that the classical theory fills this gap fittingly without doing havoc to Kanťs moral theory. The negative part will be a response to the view that no such interpretation can be made in the Kantian framework.