Abstract
Abstract The project of descriptive metaphysics in Strawson ‘s Individuals is that of identifying fundamental features, such as the role of external objects and persons, in our ordinary experience, and it is natural to associate that project with the defensible part of Kant ‘s epistemology identified in The Bounds of Sense. Subsequently Strawson modified some of the views expressed in both early books, and I shall note some of those changes; but my main aim is to contrast Kant ‘s position with those early accounts. Such an account of Kant contrasts with that of other commentators who, like Manfred Baum, regard Kant ‘s first Critiqueas essentially ontological rather than epistemo-logical or who, like Michael Friedman, emphasize Kant ‘s interest in the exact sciences rather than in ordinary experience. lt is not my intention here to defend Strawson ‘s view against these alternative positions, for they need not exclude each other, but I accept that at least part of Kant ‘s project isa descriptive metaphysics.
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