Abstract

AbstractThis paper explores Kant's conception of the relation between philosophy and its history. The idea that philosophy must account for its historical development is often associated with German Idealism. On the traditional view, the German Idealists departed from the ahistorical Kantian framework by conceiving of reason in a developmental manner, thus initiating a “historical turn” within philosophy. However, I argue that Kant's sketch of the history of metaphysics in the final chapter of the Critique of Pure Reason and in the so‐called Progress Essay anticipates this turn. Specifically, I argue that in this essay Kant articulates a developmental conception of reason as a basis for understanding the history of metaphysics. My aim is to change the prevailing view of Kant as an ahistorical thinker and to challenge the canonical account of the genesis of the historical turn in philosophy.

Highlights

  • Kant is generally seen as having exercised a broad and profound influence on the generation of thinkers that succeeded him. This is especially true of the German Idealists, whose self-professed debt to Kant is well documented in the literature

  • The incompleteness of the text, together with Rink's questionable skills as an editor, poses significant difficulties in reconstructing Kant's a priori history of metaphysics

  • Kant's a priori history of metaphysics, as shown above, aims to determine what reason does, what it can do, and what it ought to do at each stage of its development in light of its final end

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Summary

Introduction

Kant is generally seen as having exercised a broad and profound influence on the generation of thinkers that succeeded him. Emphasizing that this does not constitute theoretical cognition, Kant argues that this view of nature can provide symbolic or analogical cognition of an ultimate purpose, based on which the reality of the supersensible ideas of freedom, God, and immortality can be established (P 20:294; Cf. CJ 20:279–280).10 Kant's history of metaphysics ends with the third Critique doctrine of the purposiveness of nature, in which cognition of the supersensible is achieved and the needs of reason are satisfied (P 20:300).

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