Abstract
Kant on sex gives most philosophers the following associations: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological account within his freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of most sexual activity. Although this paper provides an interpretation of Kant’s view on sexuality, it neither defends nor offers an apology for everything Kant says about sexuality. Rather, it aims to show that a reconsidered Kant-based account can utilize his many worthwhile insights and that by making Kant’s account of sexuality more consistent with his own basic philosophical commitments, the result is a compelling approach to the complex and complicated phenomena of sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation.
Highlights
Mentioning Kant and sex in the same sentence evokes in most philosophers associations of the following kinds: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a peculiar defense of a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological view within his liberal, freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of uninhibited sexual desire and activity in general and of nonprocreative sexual desire and activity in particular
After having clarified that marriage is between men and women in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant emphasizes that unnatural sexual use takes place “either with a person of the same sex or with an animal of the nonhuman species . . . such transgressions of laws, called unnatural . . . [carnal crimes against nature] or unmentionable vices, do wrong to humanity in our own person, [and] there are no limitations or exceptions whatsoever that can save them from being repudiated completely” (6: 277)
3 Since this paper aims to explore and reconsider Kant’s approach to sexual love, sexual identity, and sexual orientation, I do not take on the question of how this account fits with his freedom writings on ethics and right
Summary
Mentioning Kant and sex in the same sentence evokes in most philosophers associations of the following kinds: a lifelong celibate philosopher; a peculiar defense of a natural teleological view of sexuality; a strange incorporation of this natural teleological view within his liberal, freedom-based moral theory; and a stark ethical condemnation of uninhibited sexual desire and activity in general and of nonprocreative sexual desire and activity in particular. Realizing a healthy predisposition to good in animality involves developing a subjective (first-personal) sense of being at home in the world as a living, embodied, social being, and it means becoming able to act with trust in the world as a good world (despite all the evidence to the contrary) Too, this kind of self-love is in itself unreflective, yet good in that it enables us to be in the world as natural-social beings with certain nonmoralized, yet normative, kinds of attitudes and emotions that express such trust in the world. Kant certainly seems mistaken to think that sex is morally permissible only within the setting of heterosexual marriage (for reasons that will become clearer below), it seems plausible that encouraging another to be as emotionally open as happens in intimate, sexually loving affectionate relationships is justifiable only if one is open oneself—and that this is why Kant argues that when we realize our sexuality in ways that involve good realizations of our animality and humanity, and our personality, we do it through marriage. This is why Kant says things like, “unnatural sex” involves
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