Abstract
This chapter argues that with Kant’s critical philosophy, the metaphysical and epistemological premises of the Christian tradition were severely criticised, which, in turn, led to a new conception of morality and evil based on the decision of autonomous, moral agents. Focusing on the late Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason reveals that Kant’s alternative conception of radical evil refers to the choice of a moral maxim that turns away from the moral law. The chapter outlines the conceptual schema and problematic orientating Kant’s analysis, namely his claim that the individual is constituted by an original natural disposition (Anlage) to the good and an innate propensity (Hang) to evil, before concluding by examining Kant’s claim that overcoming ‘evil’ is possible, despite his recognition that its grounding in individual noumenal freedom means that it is not possible to explain how this is possible.
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