Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency

Abstract

AbstractKant on Freedom and Rational Agency provides an original, comprehensive interpretation of Kant’s doctrine of freedom. It shows that for Kant absolute transcendental freedom or rational autonomy is the necessary presupposition of all meaningful, norm-governed human agency in its moral, epistemic, and aesthetic dimensions. The book thereby gives a compelling sense to Kant’s estimation that freedom is a “cardinal point,” even the “keystone” of his entire critical philosophy. Kant’s doctrine of freedom emerges as a systematic critique of a naturalistic worldview that regards all our capacities, representations, and actions as the causal upshot of natural laws and forces. The book shows why Kant holds that the naturalistic worldview fatally undermines our self-conception as rational agents. Kant’s critique of naturalism culminates in the argument that naturalistic cognizers cannot explain away our freedom from natural forces because they must presuppose such freedom in their own cognitive efforts when they aim to devise rationally valid naturalistic theories.