Kant on Democracy

Abstract

Abstract:The first part of this paper analyzes Kant’s remarks on state forms. It is true that Kant uses the term “democracy” in a pre-modern sense, denoting a radical form of despotic sovereignty that is incompatible with representative government and the separation of powers. In addition, he makes clear that it is only in non-ideal conditions that the provisional standards of republican legitimacy are less stringent than those that apply in ideal circumstances. These qualifications notwithstanding, the first part concludes that Kant fails to consider a satisfying conception of democratic sovereignty. In the remainder of this paper, I first develop this criticism in terms of the neglect of procedural (in contrast to substantive) criteria of republican legitimacy in Kant: a public norm’s normative status is determined, partly but necessarily, by the procedures that led to its enactment. Second, I show that the multifarious aspects of the one innate right of humanity (independence, equality, the duty of rightful honor, etc.) provide sufficient grounds for identifying democratic procedures as non-optional features of a Kantian republic. Moreover, that the non-optionality of democratic sovereignty, on the one hand, and the validity of the normative limits put on democratic procedures and their outcomes in the form of individual rights, on the other, rest in the same normative source (