Abstract
Abstract This chapter contrasts Humean theories of moral motivation with Kant's Critical account. It argues that standard objections to Kant fail to take heed of his general theory of action and the intrinsic difficulties in finding, on any sensible theory, a fully satisfactory ‘explanation’ of moral motivation. Kant's account of motivation must be understood in the context of his general theory of human subjectivity. Unlike contemporary quasi-Humean accounts, which depend on a two-part theory of belief and desire, Kant's theory presupposes a classical three-part distinction between cognizing, willing, and feeling. Although the second Critique is devoted specifically to what is called the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), this faculty is not to be understood simply in terms of feeling, let alone the mere determinations of pleasure and pain. Instead, for Kant this faculty primarily designates the power of choice, which presupposes cognitive and affective components but is distinct from them.
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