Kant and the general freedom of action

Fiete Kalscheuer

doi:10.9732/p.0034-7191.2019v118p191

Abstract

The legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant is complex and often confusing. Nevertheless Kant developed one of the most important liberal theories in the history of legal philosophy. The basic idea is simple: The necessity to protect the general freedom of action is the starting point of his Doctrine of Law. The only condition for this protection is that this freedom has to be compatible with the freedom of everybody else. Accordingly, for Kant even allegedly trivial actions belong to the realm of the judicial protection of the universal law of right. The question, which is to be answered in this essay, is: Why? - For what reason, Kant thinks, that there is the necessity to protect the general freedom of action.

Highlights

It is common knowledge that Kants ideas have had a major influence on the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning Art. 1 I of the German Basic Law, the dignity of man
The Federal Constitutional Court, relying on Kants second formula of the categorical imperative, the end-in-itself-formula[2], describes the rights and duties that follow from Art. 1 I of German Basic Law as follows: 2 The end-in-itself-formula says: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”
Without the adjudication of the Federal Constitutional Court on Art. 2 I of the German Basic Law there could be no so-called “theory of addressee”[11], which states that every incriminating administrative act entails the possibility of an infringement and affirms a right of action according to § 42 II of the German administrative code of procedure

Summary

Introduction

It is common knowledge that Kants ideas have had a major influence on the decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany concerning Art. 1 I of the German Basic Law, the dignity of man. Without the adjudication of the Federal Constitutional Court on Art. 2 I of the German Basic Law there could be no so-called “theory of addressee”[11], which states that every incriminating administrative act entails the possibility of an infringement and affirms a right of action according to § 42 II of the German administrative code of procedure. It is only the general protection of the universal freedom of action that leads to the fact that every action by the state that burdens a citizen requires a justification and is subject to an examination by an independent court

On the value of the general freedom of action according to Kant

The universal law of right as an expression of ethical modesty

No illegitimate moralization of the law

Conclusion