Kaksi Saksaa ja Suomi. Saksan-kysymys Suomen puolueettomuuspolitiikan haasteena by Seppo s> Hentilä (review)

Abstract

380 SEER, 82, 2, 2004 The book could have been better edited and printed to eliminate its fartoo numerous typographical errors, and the notorious wandering definite article thatplagues hastyrenderingsof Serb and Croat texts into English. University ofEdinburgh MICHAEL PALAIRET Hentila, Seppo. Kaksi Saksaaja Suomi. Saksan-kysymys Suomenpuolueettomuuspolitiikanhaasteena . HistoriallisiaTutkimuksia,2I6. SuomalaisenKirjallisuuden Seura, Helsinki, 2003. 236 pp. Notes. Bibliography.Index. ?32.00. IN recent historical times, Russia under whatever name, has been Finland's problem. But this has largely been because of Germany. Mainly, the Finns tried to get over the potentially nasty geopolitical squeeze by professing neutrality, but from 1948 to I992 neutrality had to go hand in hand with a security treaty with Russia, which was declaredly against an entity called 'Germany'. As such, for most of the period of the treaty, this had no political existence, for there were two Germanies, or two and a half if you count West Berlin. The latter figures in several of the crises in Finnish-Soviet relations, but these crises have been well worked over by other historians and do not constitute the author's principal theme. What taxes Seppo Hentila is the problem for neutral Finland of the diplomatic recognition of Germany East and Germany West. The securitytreatywith Russia was itself something of a loaded gun since itwas directednot merelyagainst'Germany'but also against 'any state allied with Germany':read West Germany and add, subsequently, NATO. Could neutrality be of use for solving the teasing question of recognizing both Germanies without offending either and without offending theirpowerfulbackers? Hentila has chartedthe searchfor the appropriatepoliticsverywell. At first glance, the outside observermight be mystifiedto findwhere the problem lay; surely a neutral could simply recognize both? This, in the mid-fifties,is what Urho Kekkonen thought of doing. But that brought him face to face with a piece of Bonn politics, the Hallstein doctrine, according to which a state that recognized East Germany (apartfrom the Soviet Union) would not be able to have diplomatic relationswith West Germany. Hentila ponders over whether Finlandwas the first,almostuntoward,victim of the doctrine. Butperhaps, in effect, it was Yugoslavia,for the Finns, in spite of theiralleged subservienceto the Soviet Union, did not recognize the GDR and did not upset the West Germans thereby.They just turnedtheir neutralityon its head and refusedto have diplomatic relationswith either Germany. Relations at the commercial levelwere, however,possibleand after I 957 FinnishtradewithWestGermany grew quite considerably.In itsturn,the Soviet Union kepton pushingFinland to do something for the GDR, such as making, for example, a separatepeace treatywith it. Nothing doing fromthe Finnishside. Every so often Kekkonen was indeed willing to oblige the Soviet and Finnish interest by slanging West German militarism. But equally, undoubtedly under the influence of WolfHalsti, he also triedto get partof the lost landsbackby agreeingwith the Soviet leadershipto recognize one-sidedly the GDR. Nothing doing from the Russian side. The Finns were stuckwith REVIEWS 38I their neutrality.But in the early seventies the high point of Finnish ingenuity was reached when those brightfellowsbroughtinto the Finnishforeign office, Risto Hyvarinen and Keijo Korhonen, concocted a 'German package deal'. Both Germanies were to be recognized in return for compensation for the devastation wrought by the Germany military in Lapland in I944 and in returnfor a guarantee of recognition of Finnishneutrality,a guaranteewhich would have made the I948 security treaty with the Soviet Union look redundant. It did not work out very well, though the GDR was interested. But the writing was already on the wall the wall in Bonn. The Hallstein doctrine was hoist by its own petard. Exceptions to it were alreadybeing made and the CSCE conferences, with the firstbig venue in Helsinkiin I973, made change imperative. Willy Brandt and his Ostpolitikwere doing the trickbetween the two Germanies and all the Finns had to do now was to slot into diplomatic relationswith both sides.No problem any more. Hentila's promised second workwill deal with the influence of the GDR in Finland, in respectof which he has alreadyestablisheda certainstarting-point in the Finnish press. As far as his present work on the recognition of the two Germanies is concerned, it is pleasurable to recount that it contains an excellent Englishsummarytranslatedby RoderickFletcher. Universiy ofTurku GEORGE MAUDE...