Abstract

Reviewed by: Justinian und die Armee des frühen Byzanz by Clemens Koehn Christian Michel Justinian und die Armee des frühen Byzanz Clemens Koehn Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter, 2018. Pp. viii + 309. ISBN: 978-3-11-059701-1 The emperor Justinian I is perhaps the most prominent figure in the history of Late Antiquity. In more than 38 years of rule (from 527 to 565), he managed to recapture great parts of the former western Roman Empire, even if it were only to last for his reign. It is therefore not surprising that he has gained much scholarly attention in recent years. While the emperor can therefore be seen as well studied, the army that was the main guarantor of the great successes in Africa and Italy, as well as Justinian's relationship to it, has been somewhat neglected. This gap in the research defines the starting point for Clemens Koehn's Justinian und die Armee des frühen Byzanz. In a very short introduction (1–7) Koehn sums up the content to follow and proposes that the emperor was more of a military man than many think today, and that he followed the idea of "lean warfare" to achieve big strategic goals with small amounts of resources. The first part, titled "Die Armee als militärisches Instrument" ("The Army as a Military Instrument" 8–145), deals with the military reforms of the emperor. It analyzes the changes undertaken by Justinian regarding the different troops and contingents, as well as tactical aspects and the armament of the soldiers. Koehn identifies the increase in the number of the comitatenses (in part by incorporating the limitanei into them) as the biggest change because it enabled the [End Page 254] emperor to react more quickly to outside attacks (25–27). Another important aspect was the reformation of the funding of the army. The emperor cut payments to inactive soldiers and stopped the automatic promotion of young ones to redistribute the financial savings to the new troops (48–53). Koehn identifies the reason for these substantial changes in the military background of Justinian. The author can demonstrate that he was already involved in a restructuring of the military and military activities during the reign of his predecessor Justin (56–67). After dealing with the emperor and his reforms, Koehn looks at the structure of the army itself. He highlights the role of the foederati and shows that the emperor increased the numbers of barbarians (67–114). Another chapter concentrates on one special form of troops: the hippotoxotai. (115–145). As the name shows, the hippotoxotai were mounted archers. For Koehn, the use and further development of those cavalry units started with the conquest of Africa in the years 533/534. After the defeat of the vandal rulers, the Romans had to face the Moorish people, who were specialized in using throwing spears against their enemies, posing great problems for the Roman army and its tactics. The Romans reacted by equipping their mounted bowman with throwing spears—the idea of the hippotoxotai was born. Under Justinian, the number of hippotoxotai was therefore increased, but it was not before the end of the sixth century that the cavalry consisted of those troops exclusively. After analyzing the military function of the army, Koehn deals with "Die Armee als politisches Instrument" ("The Army as a Political Instrument" 146–274). He examines how Justinian used the army to pursue his political aims. Koehn starts by dealing with the idea of restauratio imperii. He states that the reconquest of the former parts of the Western Roman Empire was not—in contrast to the early and in accordance with the new literature—the result of a large plan but rather of contingent circumstances that the emperor was able to use wisely. While the recapture of Africa was the starting point for the restauratio of the empire, the emperor seems to have already developed the idea of universal rule earlier. This fact is shown in the imperial propaganda that exhibits clear parallels to the imperial self-representation of former centuries. An instructive example that Koehn presents is the defeat of the Tzanoi in 528 (148–156). While they...

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