Justifying Morality, Part I: Bernard Gert’s Justification

Abstract

According to one critic, Bernard Gert’s work ‘‘may very well be the best and most significant contribution to general substantive theoretical ethics produced in the twentieth century.’’ Another has ranked Gert’s work with that of Kurt Baier and John Rawls. Although there is a substantial body of commentary on Gert’s work, little of it has been devoted to his attempt to justify morality. This is unfortunate, given Gert’s claim that the justification of morality is ‘‘the primary task’’ of his Morality: Its Nature and Justification. In Part I of this two-part article, we will examine and assess the justificatory element of Gert’s account of the moral system. We will see that Gert’s justification is successful, but limited. In Part II, we will explore whether a stronger justification of morality might be obtained by modifying the deliberative conditions Gert uses in his justification. The notable clarity that marks Gert’s description and explanation of the moral system and its key concepts unfortunately seems to desert him when he turns to his account of its justification. Gert’s most recent books, Common Morality and the revised edition of Morality: Its Nature and Justification, provide some clarifications,