Justification of Political Liberalism and the Catholic Paradox

Abstract

Rawls' justification of political liberalism has been the subject of recent discussion in socio-political philosophy. In Political Liberalism, he has adjusted his original notion of ideal convergence, found in A Theory of Justice, to one of overlapping consensus. I argue that Catholics would find themselves excluded from being good citizens as Rawls defines proper citizenship. This follows from his statements concerning fairness in participating in the democratic process in that it would lead to, what I term, the Catholic paradox. This perspective from within the Catholic point of view indicates that there are similar problems to be found in other traditionally informed conceptions of what the good life is. In this way, the Catholic paradox draws attention to the empirical implausibility that competing conceptions of what the good life is, as understood from within their traditions, will not endorse Rawls' political theory. I then relate how easily it can be inferred that other traditions will face the same paradox and that they will not accept Rawls' political theory as being justified from their perspectives.