Abstract
In this paper, I offer two counterexamples to the so-called 'Uniqueness Thesis.' As one of these examples rely on the thesis that it is possible for a justified belief to be based on an inconsistent body of evidence, I also offer reasons for this further thesis. On the assumption that doxastic justification entails propositional justification, the counterexamples seem to work. 1. The Uniqueness Thesis Do you think it is reasonable to claim that one can be rational in believing that p on the basis of certain evidence, while one could also be rational in believing that ~p on the basis of the same evidence? Or, maybe, that one can be rational in believing that p on the basis of certain evidence, while one could also suspend judgment about p on the basis of the same evidence? If you think of one of these as real possibilities, then your belief is inconsistent with the so-called 'Uniqueness Thesis':
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