Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality, by Kok-Chor Tan

Abstract

In this illuminating, and commendably readable, book Kok-Chor Tan defends global, institutional luck egalitarianism. This view comprises three claims: Global, institutional luck egalitarianism differs: (i) From trans-institutionalist luck egalitarianism, which holds that principles of distributive justice apply to individuals’ actions in the ‘thick of daily life’ also; (ii) from democratic egalitarianism which says the ground of whatever degree of distributive equality justice requires is the ideal of equal, democratic citizenship; and (iii) From statist luck egalitarianism, which implies that the scope of principles of distributive justice stops at state borders. These issues of contention between Tan and other egalitarians are centrally located in the discussion of distributive justice over the last twenty years. The first of the book’s three parts defends institutionalism. According to Tan, it is reasonable given value pluralism. Individuals are committed to ends that are not defined by justice, and the value of their pursuit of these ends is one value along with the value of justice. Institutionalism reconciles these ‘two potentially competing demands … persons have the duty to establish and support just institutions, but within the rules of these institutions persons may freely pursue their ends’ (p. 28). This raises two questions. First, suppose one holds that justice requires that the worst-off be made as well off as possible. Suppose, moreover, that this requires, Cohen-style, that people seek to benefit the worse off in their everyday life. It is unclear why the institutional approach is not then simply a way of weighing justice against a competing, non-justice value, that is, the value of personal pursuit of ends. Admittedly, for Tan, the goal of the institutional approach is not ‘to maximize social equality … Its purpose is to make it possible for persons to live meaningful and worthwhile separate lives consistent with the demands of social justice given the assumption of value pluralism’ (p. 34). However, a response to the present question that appeals to this fact assumes that the substantive demands of social justice cannot be determined independently of which institutions can accommodate individuals’ pursuit of their ends. But some luck egalitarian value pluralists reject this assumption, and it would have been good to know more about Tan’s reasons for rejecting their view.