Justice for Whom? Redressing the “1975 Shadian Incident” in the Post-Mao Era, 1978–2019

Abstract

The “Shadian conflict,” which erupted in 1964 and continued until at least 1975, was the largest religious resistance of the Cultural Revolution, but its local dynamics and sociopolitical impacts are significantly understudied. This article sheds light on how Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities have dealt with Shadian Muslims’ petitions and requests for religious freedom from 1979 until 2019. It argues that the post–Mao Zedong CCP leadership has continued to implement the same mentality and methods as in the Mao period to deal with ethno-religious conflicts. At the center of this process lies the events of 1975 that have come to be known as the “Shadian incident” or “Shadian massacre,” in which around 1,600 Shadian Muslims were killed. The party’s approaches to redressing the events of 1975 have secularized and simplified the causes of the Shadian massacre and the religious requests of Muslim villagers by attributing the tragedy and villagers’ protests to factional struggles launched by “followers of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four” and “a handful of chaos-making figures.” Embedded in ongoing struggles between vernacular and official narratives of the 1975 tragedy, the Shadian problem has resulted in unreconciled discord between the CCP, which prioritizes the Maoist class-struggle mentality, and villagers, who emphasize Islamic religiosity.