Justice and Home Affairs in the European Constitutional Process — Keeping the Faith and Substance of the Constitution

Abstract

The failure of the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in 2005 could very well have been the end of the European constitutional process for a long time.1 Too harsh was the impression of the declining votes in France and the Netherlands and too opaque the motives of those who voted against the Treaty. Even today it appears surprising that the project of a European Constitution was resumed so quickly after the Constitutional Treaty failed. There is surely a host of reasons why this became possible. However, among the most important ones, two are very striking: first of all, the project was favoured by the skilful and able approach of the German Presidency, which recovered as much as possible from the Constitutional Treaty of 2004 and abandoned most of the disturbing provisions which ulti-mately led to its rejection among European citizens.2 The second even more important aspect was the alluring political success which would be bestowed upon those governments finalising the longlasting and prestigious endeavour of a European constitution. The goal of a consolidated and further developed European constitutional framework was too tempting for the current political leaders in Europe (especially those who were not involved in the constitutional process of 2004) to resist the opportunities related to this project.