Abstract

This article assesses the significance of Canada's role in the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) and, more generally, Canada's foreign policy during the early months of the Congo crisis. It argues that Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's government pursued a policy that recognized the importance of achieving Western objectives in the Congo but at the same time eschewed the strident Cold War views of some North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. The Canadian government was forced to weigh the importance of sometimes-conflicting foreign policy considerations when developing policy during the Congo crisis, and this ultimately lead to an unwillingness to be seen to be pursuing a concerted NATO approach to the Congo's tribulations. This would suggest recent interpretations that portray Canadian participation in ONUC as an example of how Canada's peacekeeping policy primarily served Western, Cold War objectives might not be entirely correct.

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