Abstract

AbstractIn the previous chapter principle P1 was formulated : “Whenever C is fighting a just war, then it is morally permissible for S to engage in WWR to support C”. This principle can be used to construct justifications of S’s participation in WWR on behalf of C, who (we assume) is fighting a just war. However, the idea of a just war needs clarification – we at least need to know what a just war is – and also P1 itself requires support: why is it that fighting a just war is such as to make WWR morally permissible, if indeed it does? We said that it will be necessary to turn to Just War Theory (JWT) to answer these questions, and it is now time to do so. To begin with we should note that there has a been a good deal said about the idea of a just war and there is not just one single just war theory. There is in fact a just war tradition that has grown up over many centuries, with some even dating its beginnings to ancient Greece. It is not surprising that there has been a long-standing tradition of thinking about how war can be just, given that war has been such a perennial feature of human history. Surely all wars cannot be bad, for, if they are, then does this not condemn all the societies and states that have fought wars, comprising virtually all of human civilisation? This was a pressing problem for the early Christian fathers, like St Augustine, who were anxious to show that the teaching of Christ was compatible with the killing and destruction wrought by war, though clearly not all war could be just. JWT has in fact been informed by different perspectives and viewpoints, ranging from Catholic theology to international law to moral and political philosophy. While this need not result in radically different versions of modern JWT, it will best to use a version of the theory that is most congenial for present purposes, and for this reason I will make use of what I will call the ‘Walzer-Orend’ formulation. Finally, we should be aware that JWT is by no means a secure and uncontroversial theory that commands universal assent: there are problems associated with it, especially as regards the interpretation of certain of the conditions for just war and about verifying that these are satisfied. There is, however, no other viable normative theory about war and it will not be necessary, for our purposes, to accept all its principles and conditions.KeywordsNuclear WeaponCommon MoralityProportionality ConditionMoral PermissibilityProportionality PrincipleThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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