"Just Stand" and "Just Struggle": China and the Peace Process in the Middle East

Abstract

The Egyptian-Israeli peace process has put China in an awkward position: on one hand process conforms to fundamental Chinese strategic interests in area, as well as to long-held Chinese views about a possible settlement of Arab-Israeli conflict; on other hand it is obvious that Egypt is almost completely isolated and, more important, opposed by most of other Arab countries and particularly by Palestinians whom Chinese have always regarded as key to any settlement. Explicit Chinese support for peace initiative could have further strained China's already lukewarm relations with Palestinians and radical Arab states, probably driving them closer to Moscow; opposing initiative could have undermined China's special relationship with Egypt and friendship achieved since death of Nasser. Under these circumstances Chinese adhered to their time-honoured policy in Middle Eastern affairs, a policy characterised by non-commitment and ambivalence. This public ambivalence, however, could hardly conceal China's satisfaction with peace initiative as a positive and important development in Middle East. China's initial reaction was slow and cautious. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was reported in China a week after it had taken place, and then merely by quoting foreign news agencies' dispatches,1 but fact that initiative was not rejected forthwith meant approval. China's approval has become more outspoken since early 1978. For example, following his visit to PRC, French Premier Raymond Barre stated that the two parties expressed regret that recent peace initiatives have not yet borne fruit.12 A few days later a People's Daily commentary charged that the suspension of Egyptian-Israeli talks was caused exclusively by and advised: only by sticking to just stand [in addition to resisting super powers and getting united] . . . can Arab people defeat Israel's policy of aggression and compel Israel to change