Just as you like it: How allocators decide in cases of conflict between own and recipients' views of justice

Abstract

The present study examined how people, who are instructed to make just allocations, decide in situations of conflict when their personal views of what constitutes the appropriate justice standard are partly at variance with the opinions and preferences of the recipients of the allocations. We expected, in line with recent theories, which stress that justice behavior is at least partly motivated by the desire to get one's actions accepted and approved, the allocation decisions to be influenced not only by the allocators' own ideas of what constitutes a just solution but also by the preferences they perceive to exist for the recipients. It was predicted that the likelihood that allocators will abandon their personally preferred justice standards and allocate in accordance to recipients' preferences will increase with increasing numbers of cues suggesting an alternative allocation. Subjects having a strong personal preference for the equality over the equity standard of justice were asked to make just allocations of payments among two workers. Availability vs. lack of explicit information about the recipients' allocation preferences and expectation of future interaction with one of the recipients were used to operationalize differing amounts of pressure exerted on the allocators' decisions. Results showed a considerable readiness on the part of the allocators to abandon their own views of justice, the amount of readiness varying with the amount of pressure that was weighing upon them.