Jurisprudence: The Concept of Determinacy and International Law

Abstract

Jurisprudence is the basic law course in almost all universities of the world. Law professors, lawyers, legal philosophers, and others talk about jurisprudence but in a different way. Most of the discourses about jurisprudence tend to denote different perspectives rather than a specific one. When lawyers talk about jurisprudence, they generally talk about the principles established by the judiciary. When professors talk about jurisprudence they generally talk about legal thought and basic legal concepts. When philosophers discuss jurisprudence they narrate both methodological as well as a substantial facade of law. At the onset of this discussion, I would like to raise the question of whether this discourse will produce a synergy among esoteric perspectives or not. Based on the same premise, this study inquires as to how far the province of jurisprudence, as claimed determined by John Austin, is functionally efficient in determining the province of jurisprudence today. At the end of this paper, I have argued that the province of jurisprudence is unlikely to be determined as claimed by Austin. This paper offers a perspective that the province of jurisprudence can only be identified relative to the preoccupations of the age. Globalism and localism are two major preoccupations or currents of our time shaping legal and social thought and discourses. Both are very powerful, dynamic, and to certain extent at odd. The major challenge to any social science, including jurisprudence, in the 21st century, is to manage the tension between these two forces.