Jurisdiction problems regarding Internet torts: Critical remarks

Abstract

As the facts that led to the Dow Jones/Gutnick-decision of the High Court of Australia (10 December 2002) illustrate, the Internet is a powerful platform for communication. Its continuous worldwide accessibility urges discussion of a number of questions regarding tort jurisdiction. These are the starting points for some critical remarks regarding states' reciprocal claims to cross-border activities and the way in which they deal with the interests of the involved parties. For tort jurisdiction, the paper proposes and applies criteria for the assessment of the place where the harmful event has occurred or may occur (art. 5, subsection 3 Regulation 44/2001), as explained by the European Court of Justice of the European Union. Special attention is hereby given to some particularities that characterize Internet torts. On the one hand it concerns the alleged global assignment of jurisdiction that art. 5, subsection 3 may lead to and on the other hand the scope of the assigned jurisdiction in the court of the place where the damage occurs. The European approach is confronted with the principles of personal jurisdiction that are embedded in long arm statutes and the Due Process Clause, as applied in some leading American cases regarding Internet jurisdiction. It leads to suggestions regarding the development of a marginal test for the reasonableness of the jurisdiction art. 5, subsection 3 could lead to in a particular case, as well from the point of view of the weight of the connecting factor as to the scope of the jurisdiction that is based upon it.