Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter and Res Judicata

Abstract

One of our oldest dogmas is that if a court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action its pretended judgment or decree is a nullity. Thus a question of jurisdiction of the subject matter can be raised at any time during the proceedings and even for the first time on appeal. It can be raised in collateral proceedings, which means, in other words, that the judgment or decree, being a nullity, is not res jttdicata as to a subsequent legal action. It must be observed that the law of jurisdiction of the courts is neither procedural law nor substantive law. It has nothing to do with either the creation or recognition of substantive rights; it is simply a limitation on the power of a court to act as a court. Jurisdiction in general is of the same character, and thus much of constitutional law and practically all of the conflict of laws are not substantive. They impose limitations on the power of a state to act legally either in a legislative, executive or judicial manner. But the doctrine of res judicata is a doctrine of substantive law. It is that once the legal rights of parties have been judicially or impartially recognized, such recognition is subsequently conclusive as to those rights. The conclusiveness of a judgment, decree or award rests on the same basis as the conclusiveness of a written contract, will or deed. The rights so expressed are the only rights on that subject between the parties. So, stating that a judgment is not res judicata because the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action is simply another way of stating that it is no judgment, and of finally saying that a judgment to be a valid adjudication must be rendered by a court having power to deal with the subject matter. In other words, the law of jurisdiction is stated in terms of the substantive law, which is merely describing the jurisdictional concept in other language. It will be seen, therefore, that jurisdiction of the subject matter and res judicata are two separate and distinct concepts; that they are not and need not be co-extensive in result. The policy behind the jurisdictional concept is something quite different from that behind the concept of res judicata. It may well be that good policy dictates that the jurisdictional concept be preserved, and at the same time that the concept of res judicata be extended. The policy back of the preservation of the first is largely political. The