Abstract
The active development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology poses the question of how to integrate this phenomenon into legal reality, about the limits of using this technology in social practices regulated by law, and ultimately about developing an optimal model of legal regulation of AI. The paper focuses on the problem of developing the legal content of the concept of AI, including some methodological and ontological foundations of such work. The author brings to the scientific discussion certain constant characteristics of AI that are significant for legal regulation, which, if adopted by the legal scientific community, could be used as a scientifically sound basis for constructing specific variants of legal regulation that meet the needs of a particular sphere of social practice. The author believes that the scientifically based legal concept of AI is largely able to determine the direction and scope of applied legal research on the multidimensional problems of using AI technology in social interaction practices, including in the administration of justice, to distinguish the legal issues and problems related to this from ethical, philosophical, technological and other issues.According to the author, the task of forming the legal concept of AI is not limited to the formulation of specific legal definitions and cannot be solved at this level. The result of the juridification of the concept of AI should be a set of unchangeable (constant) legal characteristics, while specific definitions of this term in regulations may differ depending on the needs of legal regulation practice. In the work on the formation of a legally significant concept of AI, it is proposed to abandon the descriptive essentialist approach aimed at identifying the essence of AI in favor of an ascriptive constructivist approach, which involves attributing to the content of the concept of AI those legal properties that, on the one hand, are significant for the purposes of legal regulation, and on the other hand, limit the limits of legal regulation.
Highlights
В философии искусственного интеллекта принято различение слабого и сильного ИИ1
The active development of artificial intelligence (AI) technology poses the question of how to integrate this phenomenon into legal reality, about the limits of using this technology in social practices regulated by law, and about developing an optimal model of legal regulation of AI
The author brings to the scientific discussion certain constant characteristics of AI that are significant for legal regulation, which, if adopted by the legal scientific community, could be used as a scientifically sound basis for constructing specific variants of legal regulation that meet the needs of a particular sphere of social practice
Summary
В Концепции обращается внимание на отсутствие однозначного понимания термина ИИ и на то, что это приводит к терминологическим проблемам при формировании основ правового регулирования. Прежде чем предлагать конкретные формулировки определения термина, необходимо определиться с самой концепцией ИИ, которая может быть использована в праве, понять, что представляет собой ИИ не столько и не только с технической точки зрения, но и с правовой, осознать, каким образом вписать это новое для права явление в систему общепринятых юридических концептов, как относиться к ИИ с точки зрения права и какое место отвести рассматриваемому явлению в юридической таксономии. Конкретные дефиниции действительно могут быть разными в зависимости от целей их конструирования, однако, как представляется, прежде чем говорить о вариантах дефиниций термина ИИ, нужно определить инвариативные характеристики, поскольку инвариант задает рамки правового регулирования и допустимые пределы вариативности определений.
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