Abstract

ABSTRACT Contemporary literature on security measures interfering with the rights and liberties regime often relies on an exceptionalist approach grounded in the norm-exception dichotomy. This perspective oversimplifies the juridical conditions of exceptional security measures, where the law and politics coalesce, as the relationship between the norm and the exception is not necessarily dichotomous. Through an examination of Turkey’s exceptional security measures from 1971 to 2002, this paper shows that the tension between political power and the law can unfold in diverse ways, even in countries where executive decision-making is constitutionally favoured, with norms and exceptions usually coexisting within the constitutional order. It argues that exceptional security measures are ingrained in state rule other than in the times of exception, challenging the limited explanatory power of the norm-exception dichotomy. Categorising every decision avoiding legal oversight as the Schmittian exception results in theoretically reductionist interpretations, overlooking the fact that such measures may have various juridico-political conditions. By analysing threat framing and the dispersion of political power, this study proposes a categorisation as to how norms and exceptions to the norms are created.

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