Juicio no-racionalizado dentro del pensamiento racional/ Non-rationalized judgement within rational thinking

Abstract

In this article, we consider Wittgenstein’s approach to non-inferential knowledge, its relation to special propositions and the nature of the justification of these propositions. According to Wittgenstein, there is a kind of non-inferential knowledge whose rational status is not the result of basic beliefs (in a foundational sense) that justify it. In Wittgenstein’s rule-following analysis, Frege’s theory is criticized. This theory is based on the idea that having a conceptual repertoire prior to the understanding of any rule, requires having grasped the conditions of verification of a rule, which is a source of problems. Following Wright’s construing of Wittgenstein’s ideas, we maintain that understanding concepts cannot be prior to the linguistic ability. When you grasp concepts, you already possess linguistic ability. From the proposal of both authors, we conclude that there are some basic rules or inferences that can be understood as mental actions whose movement constitutes rational thought.