Judicial Practice as a Formal Basis for Restricting Human Rights and Freedoms

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of the formal grounds for restricting human rights and freedoms. Using the cases from the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the author confirms that judges’ creativity in the form of judicial decisions can restrict rights and freedoms, which means that it can be a formal basis for their restriction. The classic list of formal grounds, containing normative acts of various levels (from the federal constitutional law and the decree of the President of the Russian Federation to the resolution of the highest official of the constituent entity), is supplemented by judicial decisions. Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and the legal standings of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, including reviews of judicial practice, can separately be considered as formal grounds for restrictions of rights and freedoms, whereas the decisions of arbitrazh courts and courts of general jurisdiction separately do not act as formal grounds for restrictions, since they act in a targeted manner. They become formal grounds when judges make many decisions with the same interpretation (reading) of a legal norm that goes beyond its literal interpretation and restricts the rights and freedoms of the man and citizen. The established judicial practice concerning restriction of rights and freedoms must meet the same criteria as other formal grounds for restrictions, i.e., impose proportionate restrictions corresponding to the objectives set out in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.