Abstract

Background: Stability is considered a traditional legal value, particularly in relation to the stability of the constitution. This emphasis on stability stems from the need to protect the text of the constitution from frequent and unreasonable changes. However, stability must be combined with dynamism, a task primarily shouldered by the judicial branch of power through constitutional interpretation. Notably, ideas of judicial rule-making and the notion of a living/invisible constitution are only some manifestations of such a phenomenon as informal changes to the constitution. Yet, the potential risks posed by judicial intervention and the legitimacy concerns surrounding such informal changes warrant scrutiny. What is the correlation of informal constitutional changes through interpretation with the traditional doctrine of sovereign constituent power? What should be the limit of the interpretation of the constitution so that such an interpretation is not recognised as abusive? These and other issues are the focal point of research in the article. Methods: The following methods were used to research the main approaches to informal changes to the constitution. The system-structural method was used to characterise the concept of a living and invisible constitution and varieties of informal constitutional changes and to establish the relationship between these concepts. The logical-legal method made it possible to find out the content of the positions of scientists regarding the potential violation of the boundaries of interpretation of the constitution by the courts, as well as arguments for and against the legitimacy of judicial interpretation, an assessment of informal changes in the constitution from the standpoint of modern views on the doctrine of constituent power. Additionally, the comparative method was employed to study the experience of foreign countries in terms of the characterisation of binding interpretation. Results and Conclusions: The study analyses the current state of the concept of informal changes to the constitution through judicial interpretation, its connection with the doctrine of constituent power, as well as the question of the legitimacy of such an interpretation and its limits. The primary conclusion is that judicial activity guarantees the protection of the material constitution, principles and human rights. That is, the judiciary does not allow sovereign decisions made democratically (by the people) to infringe on human rights. Thus, the text of the constitution is interpreted in a conformal way to individual rights. Questions about the role of the judiciary, the possibility of informal changes to the constitution, and judicial lawmaking as such can be an indicator for distinguishing between authoritarian/totalitarian countries and democratic ones.

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