Judicial Institutionalization and Business Elite Trust in the Post-Communist Courts

Kirill M Bumin

doi:10.5539/jpl.v8n2p70

Abstract

The existing survey research in post-communist societies focuses disproportionately on the mass citizenry and largely ignores questions about elite support for judicial institutions. This study examines business elite’s confidence in the post-communist legal systems and assesses the effects of judicial institutionalization on their perceptions. It argues that as post-communist constitutional courts develop, their institutionalization helps generate positive elite perceptions of the country’s legal system. This study tests hypotheses regarding business elite confidence in the legal system with the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey data. The results show that the level of constitutional court institutionalization is an important determinant of business elite’s perceptions of the legal system. During the 1999-2005 period, businesspersons in countries with highly institutionalized constitutional courts are on average 23.5% more likely to express high level of confidence in their legal systems relative to businesspersons in countries where constitutional courts are weakly institutionalized.

Highlights

Well-functioning legal and judicial institutions are critical to economic growth and democratic consolidation in transitioning societies
In addition to drafting and adopting constitutions that enshrined the idea of an independent judiciary, the post-communist transition countries created new, specialized constitutional courts staffed with new judges to hold governments accountable and institutionalize the protection of civil and political rights
Theory linking constitutional court viability and business elite confidence in the legal system is strongly supported by the data

Summary

Introduction

Well-functioning legal and judicial institutions are critical to economic growth and democratic consolidation in transitioning societies. They define the rules by which markets function, and they provide a means to resolve disputes, protect economic, political, and social rights, and hold governments accountable for their actions. Judicial reforms in the post-communist region tended to focus on creating an independent and depoliticized judiciary, free from state control, which could act as a bulwark for newly-won political and civil rights. In addition to drafting and adopting constitutions that enshrined the idea of an independent judiciary, the post-communist transition countries created new, specialized constitutional courts staffed with new judges (mainly scholars and academics) to hold governments accountable and institutionalize the protection of civil and political rights. More detailed procedural and organizational changes that could make the courts work “better” by making them more capable, efficient, and accessible were usually not included in the early judicial reform efforts

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Results

Conclusion