Judicial Independence and Corruption: An Analysis of Latin America

Abstract

I unpack the concept of judicial independence into different components: the institutional location of the prosecutorial organ, autonomy of the judiciary, external independence of Supreme Court judges, and internal independence of Lower Court judges. I then keep track of the relation between corruption and the judiciary in three steps: detection, prosecution, and adjudication. I argue that in a system of checks and balances the relation between judicial independence and corruption is U-shaped: a dependent judiciary facilitates corruption because the elected branches would be unchecked, but totally independent judges constitute additional bribe demanders and increase corruption. I also argue that more internal independence leads to more corruption, and that a prosecutorial organ within the executive branch promotes corruption. Finally, using regression trees, I look at the relation between judicial independence and corruption in eighteen Latin American countries from 1996 to 2002. Similarities across the region (e.g. civil law heritage, presidential systems) allow us to concentrate on factors that have not been the focus of broader cross regional work.