Abstract
We seek to contribute to an understanding of how judicial elections affect the incentives and decisions of judges. We develop a theoretical model suggesting that judges who are concerned about their reputation will tend to decide against their prior decisions as they approach elections. That is, judges who imposed a large number of severe sentences in the past and are thus perceived to be strict will tend to impose less severe sentences prior to elections. Conversely, judges who imposed a large number of light sentences in the past and are thus perceived to be lenient will tend to impose more severe sentences prior to elections. Using data from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, we test, and find evidence consistent with, the predictions of our model.
Highlights
The Behavior of Federal Judges, Epstein, Landes and Posner (ELP) contrast two alternative theories of judicial behavior: the legalistic theory, which assumes that judges decide cases in accordance with orthodox norms of judicial decision-making; and the realistic theory, which conjectures that judges, like other economic agents, decide cases according to their preferences and incentives
We suggest that similar reputational considerations may implicate judicial decision making in those circumstances where judges stand for reelection or reappointment
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a short review of the literature on the effect of judicial elections on judicial decisions; Section 3 presents the theoretic reputation model; Section 4 provides an empirical examination of the model; Section 5 concludes
Summary
The Behavior of Federal Judges, Epstein, Landes and Posner (ELP) contrast two alternative theories of judicial behavior: the legalistic theory, which assumes that judges decide cases in accordance with orthodox norms of judicial decision-making; and the realistic theory, which conjectures that judges, like other economic agents, decide cases according to their preferences and incentives. Given the assumption that the public prefers strict judges, both types of judges tend to deliver more severe sentences than they would have delivered absent reputation concerns. Reputation for being strict is sufficiently strong, she would impose less severe sentences prior to elections, as she would be less concerned about "convincing" the public that she is not lenient. As a judge’s reputation for being strict becomes stronger, her sentencing behavior is expected to be less affected by her reputational concerns and more by her preference regarding the appropriate sentence in the specific case before her. In our reputation model terminology, judges who have already established reputation for being strict, are less concerned that any single decision would change how they are perceived by the public Those judges impose sentences according to their judicial preferences, without trying to convince the public that they are not lenient. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a short review of the literature on the effect of judicial elections on judicial decisions; Section 3 presents the theoretic reputation model; Section 4 provides an empirical examination of the model; Section 5 concludes
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