Judicial Councils and the process for the removal of lower-court judges in Argentina : judicial independence at the federal level, in the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires, and the province of Tucuman

Abstract

This thesis uses three case-studies to evaluate the extent to which multi-sectorial Judicial Councils and Impeachment Juries protect judicial independence in the process for the removal of lower-court judges in the Argentine Republic. Based on 36 in-depth interviews conducted with a wide range of stakeholders in the removals process, this thesis considers two jurisdictions, the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires (ACBA) and the Argentine federal level, where since the late 1990s, removals have been conducted by way of a two-step process involving judicial councils and impeachment juries, and contrasts this with the experience of the province of Tucuman, where the process is conducted by a legislative committee and an impeachment jury. The thesis evaluates whether judicial independence is better protected where judicial removals processes have been professedly depoliticised by being entrusted to independent judicial councils. Differences at the Federal and ACBA levels also illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial council model in dealing with different challenges. It concludes that whilst multi-sectorial judicial councils do prevent the arbitrary removal of judges, they do not ensure adequate judicial accountability. Additionally, the early stages of investigation into judicial behaviour are susceptible to being used as a way to place pressure on judges.