Judicial Control of Administrative Discretion 1932-1952

Abstract

rT HE CHOICE of a vantage point from which to review the work of the United States Supreme Court in the field of administrative law during the last twenty years in part predetermines what one will see. Different vantage points throw different problems into relief and suggest different (though not necessarily irreconcilable) conclusions to be drawn from the cases. The platform chosen here from which to view the work of the Court is the very broad one of judicial control of administrative discretion. Within this general area it is proposed to look at the cases from two angles; the depth of such control, and its breadth. These are not mutually exclusive terms, but rather represent different points of emphasis. By depth is meant the extent to which the courts will dip into the details of an administrative determination; by breadth, the types and kinds of administrative actions which are subject to judicial supervision and the parties entitled to seek it. More than a frame of reference is required, however. Some hypothesis about judicial motives is necessary. The hypothesis offered here can be simply stated. The Supreme Court is subject to two conflicting pressures in administrative law cases. On the one hand, the pressure of the opponents of regulatory programs, of the American Bar Association, and of disappointed litigants, among others, is for ever greater judicial control of administration. On the other hand, the increasing scope and complexity of administrative regulation and the supporters of the programs involved create a counter pressure. The point of equilibrium shifts throughout the period. From a position of judicial control both broad and deep at the beginning there is a gradual but marked retreat, leaving considerable administrative autonomy in the years immediately following the fight on reorganization of the Supreme Court. The tide then turns, and administrative discretion is eroded for many purposes to the dimensions it had at the beginning of the period. This is perhaps most clearly revealed in the cases concerned with the depth of judicial review.