Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies

Abstract

With burgeoning of federal statutes authorizing recovery of various forms of monetary relief, a recurrent question has been whether Seventh Amendment permits judges, rather than juries, to assess amount of those statutory remedies. Debate has also arisen as to whether judges may assess certain common law remedies, most prominently punitive damages, without offending dictate of Amendment that the right to trial by jury shall be preserved. The Supreme Court recently has offered conflicting views of when juries must assess legal remedies and when judges may do so. In addition, uncertainty exists over proper scope of judicial review when remedial determinations are made by juries. The author addresses extent to which judges may determine legal remedies, both as initial decisionmakers and as reviewers of jury awards. She asserts that Seventh Amendment should not be read to prohibit judges from assessing punitive damages and other remedies for which decisionmaker, in an absence of meaningful standards or rules, must exercise wide-ranging discretion in determining factors to consider and how to weigh those factors. The author also evaluates validity of some of new standards and techniques being employed by courts to review jury awards, such as comparative review of awards, use of statutory caps as guides for remittiturs below capped amounts, and exercise of independent judgment in reviewing awards of punitive damages. Finally, she argues that if courts do interpret Seventh Amendment to guarantee jury assessment of punitive damages, then jury should be principal decisionmaker on amount of relief rather than merely initial decisionmaker. She considers possible ways to accomplish this goal while protecting against unbridled jury discretion.