Abstract

The article analyses the judgment rendered by the German Constitutional Court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’) on the conformity of the Lisbon Treaty and the implementing legislation with the German Constitution (‘Grundgesetz’). It presents the complaints brought forward, then the Court’s interpretation of the standards laid down by the ‘Grundgesetz’ on democratic governance in the EU and finally the evaluation of the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty against theses standards. The analysis is organised along the main themes of the judgment. It provides a short analysis of the Court’s reasoning and the standards it lays down. It concludes that the Lisbon judgment is very similar to the 1993 Maastricht judgment (so-called ‘Brunner case’) and that the underlying democratic theory will be an impediment to developing democratic governance in the EU.

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